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ABSTRACT 
This paper will outline the changing forms of cooperation between national tax 
authorities in the taxation of income or profits from international business, especially 
transnational corporations (TNCs). The case study will illustrate broader trends of 
transformation both of statehood and the international state system, from the classical 
liberal model based on interdependence and coordination of nation-states through central 
governments, towards a post-liberal one of decentred multi-level global governance, in 
which state functions are increasingly fragmented, and coordination is increasingly by 
international regulatory networks. 
Direct taxation of income and profits has been the centrepiece of the modern fiscal state 
during the past century, when the internationalization of business, especially through 
transnational corporations (TNCs) helped to transform the world economy. In response to 
the first phase of emergence of TNCs (1870-1914), arrangements were developed for 
allocation between states of rights to tax business income (1920-1945). These were 
consolidated after 1950, and helped to lay the basis for the rapid growth of foreign direct 
investment by TNCs in the 1950s and 1960s. Increasing strain has been placed on these 
arrangements for coordination in the past thirty years, both by the increased integration of 
international business, and the greater complexity of international finance, especially with 
the emergence of tax havens and offshore financial centres. The various initiatives to 
strengthen international tax coordination are examined, focusing especially on the 
problems of (i) legitimising cooperation based on governmental and professional 
networks, and (ii) coordination between taxation and related regulatory issues, especially 
supervision of financial institutions and markets (e.g. money-laundering, financial fraud, 
and prudential supervision).?  
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A. TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE FISCAL STATE 
Taxation is key to the character and functioning of the state, economy and society. It is 
often regarded, together with defence, as the touchstone of state sovereignty. Hence, 
changes in the forms of taxation provide a good indication of changes in the form of 
statehood. 
The emergence of the modern capitalist state as a fiscal state, a concept developed in 
rather stark form by Schumpeter (Musgrave 1992), has been revised and traced in more 
detail by recent historical analysis (Bonney 1999). In broad terms, this sketches a 
transition from the feudal `domain state’, in which extraction of economic surplus by the 
ruler did not distinguish between the public and the private. The emergence of the state as 
an autonomous `public’ realm separate from the `private’ sphere of economic activity 
importantly entailed struggles over taxation. Hence, the state in early modern Europe has 
been described as a `tax state’, and certainly the ability to extract revenues, especially for 
military purposes, was the key to the effectiveness and power of states. Britain’s success 
in establishing a `fiscal-military state’ in the 18th century has been contrasted with the tax 
revolts and crises of France, where the fiscal crisis eventually sparked the French 
revolution (Daunton 2001: 7).  
In effect, Britain was able to lead the way in establishing the modern `fiscal state’, with a 
system of managing taxation and expenditure that was accepted and therefore effective. 
The need for taxation to be both legitimate and efficient was underpinned by the analyses 
of political economy, expressed most famously in Adam Smith’s four `canons’ of a good 
tax system (equity, certainty, convenience and economy)1 which are still put forward 
today. The views of enlightenment thinkers such as Smith entailed a critique of the tax 
systems of the absolutist monarchies which, although they had been a key element in the 
formation of centralised states, were experienced as capricious and oppressive. Indeed, 
Britain’s failure to legitimise taxation by extending representation in its overseas 
possessions (which was advocated by Smith) led to colonial revolts, one of which 
overthrew British rule in North America. Although enlightenment ideas about the basis of 
legitimacy of the state differed, they generally agreed that the state’s central role was to 
safeguard its citizens and their property (Frecknall Hughes 2004). In Britain, economic 
growth and the absence of major wars during the 19th century enabled Peel and Gladstone 
to fashion a strong `fiscal constitution’, establishing a high degree of mutual trust 
between government and taxpayers, based on restraint and efficiency in public 
expenditure and a shift to direct taxation of income on the principle of proportionality.2  
                                                  
1 Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Ch.II, Part II. 
2 Daunton 2001: 26-30. Fiscal discipline rested on firm Treasury control of expenditure based on the 
introduction of a clear and uniform accounting system, and principles of fiscal probity which Gladstone 
considered `at the root of English liberty’. These were, notably, budgetary unity (the rejection of 
hypothecated taxes), annual parliamentary votes to approve specific budgetary heads with no discretion for 
government to vire among them, no carry-forward of end-of-year surpluses, and no pledging of future 
revenue to finance spending (ibid. 66-76).  
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Significant further changes were necessary to cope with the needs of the welfare-warfare 
state of the 20th century, during which state expenditure rose from around 10% to some 
40% of GDP in developed countries. The centrepiece of the modern fiscal constitution 
has been the income tax. This was described by Schumpeter as the quintessential `tax of 
bourgeois liberalism’, although his view that the shift to large-scale economic activity 
and increased public expenditure would create a `fiscal crisis of the state’ was belied by 
its transformation into a mass tax (Musgrave 1992). The principle of proportionality was 
modified by an acceptance of graduation, or higher tax rates on higher income, justified 
by the concept of ability to pay developed by marginalist economics (Daunton 2001: 
144). Although this has greatly helped to legitimate income taxation, and seems to be 
surviving current debates about a `flat tax’, there has always been a potential threat due to 
the inequities when applied to different types of income. Collection has always been 
more effective where tax can be deducted at source, or from income which is easily 
verifiable, such as a regular wage or salary. It has been more difficult, and the liability 
subject to contestation, for income from capital, from business, or from a self-employed 
trade or profession. Indeed, the very concept of income has been continually contested 
(Daunton 2004), both in direct interactions between tax officials and taxpayers or their 
advisers, and in wider public debate. 
The problem of legitimacy of income taxation has been a key factor in the crisis of the 
Keynesian fiscal state since the mid-1970s. In many countries wage-earners became 
increasingly reluctant to accept tax burdens which they perceived as inequitable, 
especially due to the greater effectiveness of collection at source (and in advance, via 
pay-as-you-earn) from employment income, compared with the many opportunities for 
avoidance available for some types of income from capital, business or self-employment. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that tax burdens on business or on high earnings 
hinder entrepreneurship and discourage achievement. At the same time, economic 
liberalisation has undermined the foundations of national tax systems, and created 
pressures on states to reduce taxes, especially on capital income (Avi-Yonah 2000, Tanzi 
2001). These forces have led to many attempts at reforms both of tax policy and 
administration.  
Policy reforms have generally entailed reducing high marginal rates of income tax while 
trying to broaden the tax base by ending tax breaks and combating avoidance, as well as 
widening the tax net by introducing new sources of revenue such as sales and transaction 
taxes. Although the virtues of tax `neutrality’ have often been extolled, in practice tax 
rules have been extensively used for social engineering purposes, producing an ever-
growing volume of complex rules, and attempts at structural reform of income taxes have 
largely failed. In the absence of structural reform, there has been an introduction of new 
managerial techniques into tax administration, which has become more professionalised, 
with revenue authorities often being given greater autonomy from government, although 
within a defined remit. The aim is to rebuild the confidence and trust of citizens in public 
services, mainly through technocratic approaches to efficiency. However, as tax 
administrations are being asked to do more with fewer resources (to achieve `efficiency 
gains’), there has not surprisingly been talk of a crisis in tax administration (Aaron & 
Slemrod 2004: 2-4).  
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It may be said that in taxation, as in other areas of governance, there has been a transition 
to a new regulatory state.3 Many state functions have been delegated to autonomised 
public bodies working within a culture of service delivery, with corporate plans, customer 
charters, and performance targets (Hamilton 2003). The aim is to rebuild the confidence 
and trust of citizens in public services, mainly through technocratic approaches to 
efficiency. It entails new forms of networked interaction and relationships between the 
so-called public and private spheres . In place of the top-down model of action by a 
centralised state, the fragmentation of the public sphere results in networks operating 
through new kinds of regulation which are more diverse and interactive, or `reflexive’.  
B. NATIONAL TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INCOME 
The introduction of income taxation by national states took place in a period when the 
leading capitalist economies were already highly globalised, through extensive flows of 
both trade and investment.4 The issue of tax jurisdiction throws into sharp relief the 
contradictions of the national state in the classical liberal internationalist system. From 
the beginning, the application of national taxes to income which might derive from 
international business, raised issues of the scope of national taxation and possibilities for 
international coordination. Even if tax jurisdiction is territorially-based, an income tax 
may still produce overlapping jurisdictional claims, since it may be applied both to 
persons within the territory and to income earned within the territory paid to a person 
outside it. The UK, which pioneered the income tax, applied it to residents on income 
from all sources, as well as to non-residents on income earned from UK sources. When 
the US introduced a federal income tax after ratification of the 16th amendment to the 
Constitution in 1913, it applied to citizens on income from all sources, and to US-source 
income.  
Differences in national approaches to defining which persons should be subject to income 
tax also created potential jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts, as well as possible 
competitive inequalities between firms operating in the same markets. For example, the 
US citizenship basis, when applied to firms, covered only US-incorporated entities, and 
did not apply to a US-owned foreign subsidiary. In contrast, the UK tax applied to 
residents, which raised several questions: when should a company be regarded as 
`resident’ in the UK, and what income should be regarded as attributable to a company, 
as well as how to characterize such income (due to the schedular structure of the UK 
                                                  
3 Many writers have used the term or the general concept (notably Teubner 1987, Majone 1993, Pildes and 
Sunstein 1995, Loughlin 1997, Braithwaite 2000, Scott 2000), and with different actual states in mind; 
clearly the changes are far from uniform but vary greatly between different national contexts (for a recent 
comparative overview see Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004). Nor do they lead to a settled or even clearly 
identifiable outcome: indeed, Michael Moran argues that a key feature, at least of the British regulatory 
state, is `hyper-innovation’ (Moran 2003). Most recently, John Braithwaite has explicitly applied the 
concept to the area of tax administration (J. Braithwaite 2005).  
4 Indeed, income taxation facilitated a shift away from reliance on high tariffs, so potentially encouraging 
trade. 
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income tax).5 The concept of residence has never been defined by statute in the UK, but 
the courts developed the test of `central management and control’, which since a 
company is considered to be managed by the directors on behalf of its shareholders, was 
taken to mean the location of the meetings of the board of directors.  
This meant that companies financed from London but carrying out operations abroad, of 
which there were a great many in the heyday of the City of London as the centre of world 
finance, were taxable in the UK on their worldwide profits. This was starkly illustrated by 
the leading case of De Beers (1906), in which the House of Lords held that the De Beers 
mining company, which was formed under South African law and had its head office, 
general meetings and all its mining activities there, was nevertheless a British resident, 
since `the directors' meetings in London are the meetings where the real control is always 
exercised in practically all the important business of the company except the mining 
operations’(De Beers 1906: 213). Some of the judges had shown an awareness of the 
international implications of the question. Thus, in 1876 Chief Baron Kelly remarked that 
the issue involved `the international law of the world’, since many of the shareholders 
were foreign residents, so that much of the earnings of the company belonged to 
individuals not living in Britain and therefore `not within the jurisdiction of its laws’. 
However, he contented himself with the thought that if such foreigners chose to place 
their money in British companies, they `must pay the cost of it’ (Calcutta Jute 1876: 88).  
The issue looked very different from the viewpoint of some of the leaders of British 
international business. This was expressed perhaps most clearly by Sir William Vestey, 
who was to become well-known in UK tax law, and who with his brother had built a 
corporate empire from a grocery firm by importing dried eggs from China and frozen 
beef from Argentina. He argued for fairness in relation to his international competitors, 
especially the Chicago Beef Trust, which paid no UK tax by being based abroad and 
consigning its shipments to independent importers in the UK. He proposed a global 
approach based on the proportion of sales in each country: 
`In a business of this nature you cannot say how much is made in one country and 
how much is made in another. You kill an animal and the product of that animal is 
sold in 50 different countries. You cannot say how much is made in England and 
how much is made abroad. That is why I suggest that you should pay a turnover 
tax on what is brought into this country. ... It is not my object to escape payment 
                                                  
5 Different categories of income were (and still are) taxed differently according the Schedule and Case to 
which they might be attributed; in particular income or profits of a trade were taxable as they arose, while 
income from securities or possessions were taxable only when remitted to the UK. Thus, UK shareholders 
of a foreign-resident company would only be liable for UK tax on dividends remitted to the UK; whereas if 
the company itself were regarded as UK resident, its worldwide trading profits would be regarded as 
directly taxable in the UK. For further details of the court decisions and interpretations involved see 
Picciotto 1992, 6-8.  
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of tax. My object is to get equality of taxation with the foreigner, and nothing 
else.’6 
However, the British state was reluctant to modify its claim to tax all British residents 
(and companies based in the UK) on all their income, except by international agreement. 
The issue was taken up by the League of Nations through a Fiscal Committee, which 
commissioned two reports, first from economists and then tax experts, leading to a 
diplomatic conference in 1928. The result fell short of the multilateral agreement which 
some had hoped for, but took the innovative form of model tax treaties, which could be 
used as a template for bilateral treaties between states, with modifications to suit their tax 
systems and the capital flows between them. The Committee subsequently commissioned 
a study on the difficult issue of `allocation of business income’ (later termed Transfer 
Pricing), which was carried out by Mitchell B. Carroll, the US representative, who visited 
35 countries, meeting both officials and business representatives.7 This study resulted in 
another model convention, on allocation of business income, which later was 
incorporated into the basic income tax treaty model (see generally Picciotto 1992, ch. 1). 
The approach adopted in the model treaties was to allocate rights to tax between the 
home and host states of international investors. As regards foreign direct investment by 
TNCs, a host state could tax the business profits of a local subsidiary, as well as those of 
a local office or branch of a foreign firm, provided it fell within the definition of a 
Permanent Establishment. To prevent double taxation, the treaty should oblige the home 
state either to exempt foreign-source income, or allow a credit for taxes paid in 
accordance with the treaty.  
This approach preserved to the maximum the freedom of each state to define its own 
income tax system, while establishing sufficient coordination to facilitate economic flows 
between states. The form of international cooperation it entailed was minimal and also 
reinforced national state sovereignty, since it required no commitment to an overarching 
multilateral arrangement or even any agreed international principles for defining or 
allocating the tax base of internationally-operating businesses. Thus, it fell significantly 
short of the approach suggested by William Vestey. In particular, the Carroll report 
resulted in an emphasis on taxation of the components of a TNC (subsidiaries and 
branches) on the basis of separate national accounts, treating each component as if it were 
an independent business, based on the so-called `arm’s length’ criterion. This left 
                                                  
6 UK Royal Commission on Income Tax 1920, Evidence, p. 452, Question 9460. 
7 The study was funded by a $90,000 grant by the Rockefeller Foundation. Carroll had been partly educated 
in Europe, and worked for the Department of Commerce on taxation of US business in Europe; he was 
instrumental in persuading the US to participate the Fiscal Committee, and accompanied Prof. Adams, the 
Treasury’s Economic Adviser, to its meetings in 1927-8. He chaired the Fiscal Committee between 1938 
and 1946, during which time it consolidated the model treaties which it bequeathed to the UN and later the 
OECD, while at the same time taking a leading part in founding the International Fiscal Association, of 
which he became the long-serving first President (Carroll 1978, Picciotto 1995 41-43).  
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legitimation of business profits taxation to each state, by avoiding the need for 
international agreement on an allocation formula.  
This reinforcing of the national basis of income taxation created a disjuncture with the 
international-integrationist economic logic of TNCs. The problem was well understood 
by the technical specialists, as revealed in the country studies of the Carroll report, 
several of which showed a preference for a fractional apportionment approach. This 
would entail taxing the local operations of a TNC on the basis of an appropriate 
proportion of the worldwide profits of the firm treated as a whole. Even the UK report, 
which advocated separate accounting, stated that alternative approaches such as 
calculation of profits as a proportion of turnover were applied in nearly half the cases, 
and its availability was generally important in preventing taxpayers `taking up an 
unreasonable attitude’ (cited in Picciotto 1992, 30). The possibility of adopting an 
international formula apportionment approach to allocation of business profits was 
addressed both by Carroll and Ralph C. Jones, a Yale professor, who produced a study on 
the accounting aspects for the Carroll report. They recognised that, to the extent that a 
TNC was operated as an integrated enterprise, there would inevitably be difficulties in 
attributing and allocating specific items both of income and expenditure to its constituent 
parts. However, they considered it to be `quite inconceivable’ that states could agree on a 
general formula apportionment principle, especially if it would require them (in Jones’s 
words) to `permit income earned within their jurisdiction to be reduced by losses 
sustained elsewhere’ (cited in Picciotto 1992, 34).  
Thus, the separate accounts and arm’s length pricing approach resulted from the view 
taken by technical specialists of the difficulty of reaching international political 
agreement on a global standard. However, the technical specialists also understood that in 
practice fractional apportionment would be inevitable, but it would have to be applied on 
a case-by-case basis. This would entail arrangements for cooperation between the 
national fiscal authorities, which the German report in particular presciently suggested 
might provide a basis for development of agreed general principles, perhaps in the form 
of defined allocation percentages (ibid. 35). The League treaty models included treaties 
for cooperation in both assessment and collection of taxes, but states proved reluctant to 
agree such provisions (ibid. 251-2). These proposals had originated from the report of the 
League’s Technical Experts (essentially national tax officials), which had stressed that 
arrangements to prevent international double taxation should be complemented by 
measures to combat fiscal evasion, while accepting that international administrative 
assistance should not amount to `an extension beyond national frontiers of an organised 
system of fiscal inquisition’. Nevertheless, in practice states were reluctant to make 
provision for cooperation between tax administrations, and despite various safeguards 
suggested by the Fiscal Committee, the model treaties eventually included only a 
minimal provision for exchange of information necessary for implementation of the 
treaty.  
Indeed, the autarchic political climate of the 1930s was not conducive to the conclusion 
of international agreements, and even bilateral treaties to prevent double taxation based 
on the League models were slow to develop, although almost 60 were signed by 1939. It 
was not until the 1950s that an extensive network of bilateral tax treaties began to grow, 
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and then mainly between the developed OECD countries, due to the stronger basis of 
reciprocal capital flows between them. Although the United Nations established a 
Financial and Fiscal Commission, it was riven by Cold War and North-South conflicts, 
and ceased to meet after 1954. The mantle of the League’s Fiscal Committee was taken 
over by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of the OECD, whose Treaty Models and 
Commentary, as well as periodic reports (produced especially since the seminal report on 
Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprise of 1979), have provided the formal 
backbone of the international tax system. 
However, the sinews of the system have been the professional specialists in international 
taxation, mainly acting on behalf of business firms and associations. As professionals 
working for private clients or public bodies (and often both), these `creative ideologists’ 
operate between the state and the market, and play a crucial role in creating regulatory 
arenas (Dezalay 1996). Mitchell Carroll himself kept in close touch with business firms 
and associations even while working for the government, and went into private practice 
in 1933, although also still serving as the US representative on the League’s Fiscal 
Committee, as well as acting as consultant to the State Department on international tax. 
His tax practice appears to have consisted of helping to resolve major anomalies and 
difficulties experienced by large TNCs, such as Unilever, Morgan Guaranty Trust, and 
ITT. The cases he recounts generally involved interceding directly with governments, 
including persuading negotiators to include appropriate provisions in treaties under 
negotiation (Carroll 1978, 113-15). While he was clearly an old-style `gentleman-
lawyer’, he helped to create a regulatory arena which later became dominated by 
bureaucratised law and accountancy firms producing complex tax-avoidance `products’ 
such as double-dip leasing or currency/interest rate swaps (Picciotto 1995). 
C. LEGITIMACY STRUGGLES OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
Paradoxically, the state-based system for taxation of international business income and 
profits greatly helped to stimulate international integration of economic activities under 
the aegis of TNCs. Far from acting as an impediment, the partial and imperfect 
coordination of national tax systems established by the formal legal structures stimulated 
these large firms to develop their own arrangements. Despite the improvements in 
international communications, and contrary to common assumptions, the organization of 
businesses on a global scale is not easy, indeed its history is littered with disastrous 
ventures into foreign markets, as well as successes. The competitive advantages of TNCs 
were not due to closer international political integration, but the converse: it was their 
ability to take advantage of and manage differences in the social, political and economic 
conditions between countries which powered their rapid growth.8 Clearly, some obstacles 
are too difficult to surmount, such as discrimination against foreign ownership, or severe 
volatility in conditions between countries. However, the institutional framework 
                                                  
8 J. H. Dunning, a leading theorist of TNCs, explains their growth in terms of ownership-specific and 
location-specific advantages, deriving from their `privileged ownership of, or access to, a set of income-
generating assets, or from their ability to coordinate these assets with other assets across national 
boundaries’ (2001, 176).  
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developed after 1945 was very propitious for FDI, precisely because it involved a strong 
but limited form of economic coordination between states. TNCs became adept at 
selecting and combining the most appropriate locations for their operations, based not 
only on social and economic conditions (such as skilled but relatively low-cost labour), 
but also political and regulatory factors. Among the most important of these was taxation. 
But the success of giant TNCs at coordinating activities across the globe drew along with 
them a wider range of smaller and medium sized firms, and resulted in deeper 
international integration, undermining some of the mechanisms of national state 
economic management. 
In effect, the various interactions between the tax authorities and the professional 
advisers of internationally-operating businesses over a long period of time helped to 
construct the international tax system. This entails conflicts and negotiations over the 
limits of legitimacy of taxation, largely waged through legal practices of interpretation of 
legal texts, aptly described by Bourdieu as struggles to appropriate the `symbolic power 
which is potentially contained within the text’, or to `control’ the legal text (Bourdieu 
1987: 818; Picciotto forthcoming). This is perhaps especially prevalent in a field such as 
income taxation, which depends to a great extent on abstract and indeed artificial 
concepts, not least that of income. Determination of the national jurisdictional scope of 
taxation depends on the concept of residence, which is especially problematic for 
artificial legal persons such as the company. 
Among the reasons given for adopting the test of `central management and control’ by 
the House of Lords in De Beers was that the alternative test, put forward on behalf of the 
company, of the place of incorporation, could easily be avoided `by the simple expedient 
of being registered abroad and distributing its dividends abroad’ (De Beers 1906: 213). 
Indeed, this was exactly (and has remained) the position for US TNCs, which benefit 
from deferral of US taxes on income earned by their foreign subsidiaries. But the 
`control’ test was highly indeterminate, and as applied to artificial legal persons such as 
companies or partnerships was not defined by statute in the UK.9 In practice, the Revenue 
interpreted it to mean the place where the key strategic decisions of Directors were taken, 
as against the `passive’ control exercised by shareholders. However, this provided at best 
a shaky basis for asserting a right to tax the worldwide profits of multinational company 
groups (TNCs). In the 1970s, as the pace of internationalisation accelerated, and TNCs 
evolved more complex patterns, the control test could be used to enable companies to 
arrange financial or servicing functions in affiliates whose central management and 
                                                  
9 Under the `control’ test, even a company formed under UK law could be a foreign resident: Egyptian 
Delta Land and Investment Co. Ltd v. Todd (1929). This decision created a loophole which in a sense made 
Britain a tax haven: foreigners could set up companies in the UK, which would not be considered UK 
resident under British law because they were controlled from overseas, but might be shielded from some 
taxation at source because they were incorporated abroad.  This possibility was ended by the Finance Act 
of 1988 (s. 66), which provided that companies incorporated in the UK are resident for tax purposes in the 
UK, bringing the UK substantially into line with many states (especially European Community members), 
which use both incorporation and place of management as tests of residence. However, the control test still 
applied to companies incorporated outside the UK, as well as to unincorporated associations such as 
partnerships, and remained relevant for tax treaties.  
 10 
control could be said to be located elsewhere, and thus reduce UK tax by deducting 
interest charges, management fees or insurance premiums from the UK trading profits of 
their related entities.  
Furthermore, tax planners could set up foreign-resident companies to ensure that 
individuals resident in the UK could escape tax on income from foreign activities. Thus, 
the entertainer David Frost in 1967 set up a foreign partnership with a Bahamian 
company to exploit interests in television and film business outside the UK (mainly his 
participation in television programmes in the USA); the courts rejected the views of the 
Revenue that the company was a mere sham to avoid tax on Frost's global earnings as a 
professional - the company and partnership were properly managed and controlled in the 
Bahamas and their trade was wholly abroad (Newstead 1980).  
The Vestey family were pioneers of international tax planning, which became the focus 
of a long-running conflict with the Revenue, resulting in a series of court judgements, 
most of which they won. The Vestey brothers had left the UK in 1915 and moved the 
control of their business to Argentina, to avoid the consequences of the British rule on 
residence of companies. In his evidence to the Royal Commission in 1919 for measures 
against international double taxation, mentioned above, William Vestey stated that while 
his tax position in Argentina suited him admirably, he would prefer to come back to 
Britain to live, work and die. He also wrote to the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, stating 
that if the brothers could be assured that they would pay only the same rate of tax as the 
American Beef Trust paid on similar business, they would immediately return. Failing to 
receive such assurances, they took legal advice from 1919 to 1921, as a result of which 
they established a family Trust in Paris. Returning to London, they leased all their 
properties, cattle lands and freezing works in various countries to a UK company, Union 
Cold Storage, stipulating that the rents should be payable to the Paris trustees. The trust 
was set up so that its income should be used for the benefit of their family members (but 
not themselves); the trust deed also gave the Vestey brothers power to give directions to 
the Trustees as to the investment of the trust fund, although subject to such directions the 
Trustees were given unrestricted powers (Knightley 1993). When it eventually 
discovered the existence of these (and no doubt other similar) arrangements, the Revenue 
put through Parliament in 1936 and 1938 the first provisions against foreign trusts. These 
became the focus of long-running legal battles in the courts, in which the Vesteys 
eventually prevailed, leading to revisions of the legislation, and inevitably further 
litigation. 
Thus, it was through debates about the legitimate limits of national taxation of 
international business, mediated by technical practices of textual interpretation and 
statutory revisions, that the international tax system was constructed. Thus, the claim to 
tax the worldwide profit of residents was mitigated by the introduction of foreign tax 
credit arrangements. Conversely, the use of intermediary companies to shelter overseas 
income was tackled by most developed countries, which introduced measures in the 
1970s and 1980s to combat such use of foreign `base’ companies, by treating the income 
of `controlled foreign corporations’ (CFCs) as attributable to their parent companies. 
However, CFCs must be defined, often by complex rules, and the attributable income is 
generally limited to `passive’ investment income. Thus, some services can be provided to 
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internationally-operating businesses which, if they can arguably be said actually to be 
carried out `offshore’ (and hence produce `active’ income), may benefit from a low tax 
rate in the chosen jurisdiction, as well as reducing tax on trading profits of the operating 
companies which pay for these services.  
The extent to which these types of arrangements are valid depends on an increasingly 
complex maze of different national rules and their interactions. Thus, what constitutes 
compliance continues to be negotiated. However, the concern of national tax authorities 
to ensure their `fair share’ of the tax base of international business is also 
counterbalanced by concerns to ensure their country maintains its international 
competitiveness in attracting investments and as a base for such business.  
There are genuine issues and disagreements about the definition and jurisdictional 
allocation of the income from international business, which are fought out in these 
struggles to `control the text’. The problem is that these issues have become largely 
obscured because the texts are so complex and esoteric that they are accessible only to a 
small number of specialists. Even these experts would find it hard to explain the 
underlying justification for many of the rules.  
D. TAX HAVENS AND `OFFSHORE’  
A key element in the strategies of management of regulatory interactions has been the 
resort to `havens’ or `offshore’ centres, which act as jurisdictions of convenience for 
regulatory avoidance. Their main use has been for avoidance of tax, although this has 
been linked with, and has spread to, avoidance of other types of regulation, especially of 
financial regulation.  
International regulatory avoidance strategies essentially entail choosing a convenient 
jurisdiction in which to create a legal entity, such as a corporation, partnership or trust, 
which can be used as a vehicle to own assets or through which to channel transactions. 
This is in a sense a type of forum shopping, since the aim generally is to relocate 
activities (at least nominally) to a jurisdiction which not only offers more favourable 
rules, but more importantly can provide a shelter from the regulations of other 
jurisdictions. This type of shelter, which originated with the desire to avoid taxation, is 
generally referred to as a haven. 
Other kinds of activities have also made use of the `offshore’ phenomenon. Commercial 
radio stations mushroomed in the 1960s aiming at breaking the monopoly of state 
broadcasting (such as Radio Luxembourg and Radio Caroline). They were described as 
`pirates’, since some of them actually broadcast from ships on the high seas, and this 
analogy was perhaps the source of the term offshore (Palan 2003, 22). Similarly, `flags of 
convenience’ (FoC) in international shipping began to boom after the 2nd world war, 
growing from under 4% of world tonnage in 1948 to 14% in 1960, 26% in 1970 and 34% 
in 1990 (Kassoulides 1993, 83). This also had a longer history, as US shipowners had 
begun to use the Panama registry in the 1920s, initially to avoid the liquor prohibition 
laws, and in the 1930s firms such as Standard Oil of New Jersey and United Fruit 
reflagged their ships there. They were joined by others, notably Erling Naess, a 
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Norwegian who had set up a whaling company in London in 1928. He found that by 
reregistering his ships in Panama and moving the residence of his company to Paris, the 
company’s shipping profits would be tax-free (Naess 1972, 2-3). Thus, the FoC system 
could combine avoidance of tax and other regulations, including vessel safety rules and 
labour laws (Murphy 2004, ch.2). By the 1990s, the growth of the Internet opened up 
new possibilities for `offshore’, such as online gambling, which also was a development 
of the earlier phenomenon of casinos being located in favourable jurisdictions. 
`Offshore’ became a generalized phenomenon by the 1970s, and acted as a catalyst for a 
dual process of national deregulation and international reregulation. Controls over 
economic activity based on direct state command over `national’ firms often had to be 
abandoned, but as a result international regulatory networking gradually emerged. In 
some contexts, national deregulation entailed the creation of onshore enclaves. For 
example, the US Federal Reserve created an International Banking Facility in New York 
in 1981, yielding to pressures from US banks, and in response to the rebirth of London as 
an international finance centre, mentioned above. The intention of the US authorities was 
to pressurize the Bank of England to agree reserve requirements for international banking 
(Hawley 1984). They did not succeed until 1988, but gradually the central banks, acting 
mainly through the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, did evolve coordinated 
arrangements for prudential supervision of banking and finance, although this has been a 
painful process marked by dramatic failures (Kapstein 1994, Wood 2005).  
Similarly, a number of developed states reacted to the growth of flags of convenience for 
international shipping by introducing special `captive’ registries of their own for 
nationally-owned vessels, offering tax breaks and allowing employment of foreign 
seafarers.10 This followed the failure of attempts to bring shipping back under national 
state control, by multilateral treaty provisions requiring a genuine connection with the 
flag state.11 Nevertheless, regulatory arrangements have emerged, largely in response to 
sustained campaigns especially by the trade union body the International Transport 
Federation (ITF). Thus, a form of global governance of shipping has emerged, albeit with 
some significant gaps and deficiencies (Couper et al. 1999, 172-6; Gerstenberger & 
                                                  
10 Some of these are through offshore dependencies, such as the Isle of Man, Madeira, the Netherlands 
Antilles, or the French Kerguelen Islands; while others (such as Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg and 
Norway) are special facilities, sometimes established in cooperation with other states (Luxembourg, which 
is landlocked, established its registry as a facility for Belgium). 
11 A requirement of a genuine link between a ship and its flag state was included, at the instigation of the 
Netherlands, in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, and repeated in identical terms in art. 91 of 
the 1982 UNCLOS. However, `genuine link’ was not defined, and the article explicitly states that `each 
state shall fix the conditions for the grant of nationality to ships’. Art. 94 of UNCLOS requires flag states to 
administer their fleets and take measures to ensure safety at sea, but only in general terms. Attempts 
through UNCTAD to negotiate an agreement defining the `genuine link’ produced a 1986 UN Convention 
which was a weak compromise, effectively legitimizing the FoC (Kassoulides 1993, 83): it specifies that 
there must be either `appropriate’ participation in the ownership of ships by nationals of the flag-state, or a 
`satisfactory’ proportion of the crew must be its nationals. The convention received too few ratifications to 
enter into force. 
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Welke 2002). It combines international standards for safety both of ships and of 
shipboard employment conditions,12 with enforcement by port state inspection systems of 
ships, and by the ITF of employment conditions, coordinated through international 
networks. 
The offshore phenomenon is not just a matter of a few rogue jurisdictions, but the result 
of the mutual interactions of states more generally. As we have seen, the jurisdictional 
interaction inherent in the classical liberal system of inter-dependence could be exploited 
by the strategies of jurisdictional selection and regulatory avoidance, designed by 
transnational lawyers and other specialists. As national regulation became more rigorous, 
techniques of avoidance became more sophisticated. As one such specialist put it, 'For the 
professional, “offshore” is now a structural tool in the efficient management of clients' 
affairs' (Cabral 1995, 24). Operating at the interface between the private and the public, 
these specialists were active not only in creating regulatory avoidance devices for private 
clients, but also in designing favorable regulatory provisions by acting as advisers to 
governments. As part of attempts to restore confidence and credibility in the financial 
security of OFCs, some countries have had their laws designed by global professional 
firms acting as government consultants (Gallagher 1990). Although this role of `double 
agent’ is a delicate one and therefore confined to a small elite in large developed 
countries such as the US (Dezalay 1996, 66), small jurisdictions can be prone to advice of 
a less scrupulous character.13 Particularly radical advice was provided by a team of US 
lawyers aiming to promote Nepal as an `offshore’ financial center. They suggested that, 
rather than developing its own regulatory system (even if based on foreign models), 
Nepal should directly incorporate the laws of other countries. This would allow foreign 
                                                  
12 The International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the intergovernmental body with primary responsibility 
for shipping, was committed to the principle of regulation by the flag state, despite the failure to establish a 
genuine link requirement. However, the ITF campaigns led to the adoption by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), of Convention 147 on Minimum Standards in Merchant Ships in 1976. This requires 
flag states to exercise effective jurisdiction over their ships and to establish laws and regulations covering a 
range of safety standards and shipboard employment conditions ‘substantially equivalent’ to those in a 
specified list of related ILO conventions. Importantly, however, article 4 gave jurisdiction for port states to 
enforce these standards, including taking measures necessary to rectify conditions ‘clearly hazardous to 
safety or health’, though they must also not ‘unreasonably detain or delay the ship’. This provided 
encouragement and authority for the development of a network of arrangements for inspection to enforce 
international standards using Port State Control (Kassoulides 1993), beginning with the Paris group of 
European countries, followed by Asia-Pacific, Caribbean and Latin American groups. In this way, 
cooperating maritime authorities have established sophisticated inspection systems, based on checklists of 
internationally-agreed standards, deficiency reporting, a computerised database, and the ultimate sanction 
of detention: see material available on http://www.parismou.org. This has been further strengthened by the 
IMO’s reorientation to accepting that its standards should be internationally enforceable, rather than relying 
entirely on the flag state. 
13 Thus the Cayman Islands Trusts Act of 1967 resulted from advice from `private interests’ in the UK, 
causing great concerns to the Inland Revenue (PRO file T295-892). 
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firms registering in Nepal to choose the laws under which they and their transactions 
would be regulated.14  
Although specially-designed laws may be found everywhere, some states or statelets 
offer a more comprehensive package of arrangements specifically devised for avoidance 
purposes of one sort or another, so they may be considered designer jurisdictions. This 
phenomenon has been described as the `commercialization of sovereignty’ (Palan 2002, 
2003, 59-62). The competition among such jurisdictions makes it hard to take counter-
measures against them, since if one is targeted another is likely to take its place. This 
competition also leads to differentiation. Typically, states which established themselves 
early as leaders, such as Liberia for shipping, or Switzerland for private banking, or the 
Cayman Islands for offshore bank accounts, are more willing to try to safeguard their 
reputations (and hence their market share) by ensuring high standards in other aspects of 
regulation, such as maritime safety or prudential regulation of banks. Their later 
competitors entering the market are likely to be less scrupulous, and willing to relax more 
standards. They are therefore more likely to become the targets of international counter-
measures, which paradoxically results in the leading offshore states being held up as good 
examples, and legitimizing their use for avoidance of other rules, especially taxes. 
As we have seen above, the exploitation of jurisdictions of convenience relies on taking 
advantage of fictions such as corporate personality, and the indeterminacy of abstract 
legal concepts such as income and residence. It is not usually, as is sometimes asserted, a 
matter of the greater international mobility of `capital’, since this type of avoidance 
normally involves little or no genuine economic activity in the haven jurisdiction. Thus 
ships registered under a flag of convenience have little contact with their state of registry; 
offshore radio stations will generally broadcast programmes recorded elsewhere; 
companies formed in tax havens to receive tax-avoiding income are usually no more than 
`brass plate’ entities to which assets have been notionally transferred; and banking or 
financial transactions attributed to offshore centres have only a fictional relationship with 
them. Thus, a distinction can in principle be made between a legitimate jurisdictional 
choice, for example if a person chooses to be a tax exile by deciding to live in a low-tax 
state, in contrast to avoiding tax in a country of residence by accumulating foreign earned 
income in a trust or company formed in a haven. However, the distinction can be very 
hard to maintain, especially for financial services (e.g. insurance), and these are therefore 
the main users of the offshore system. 
E. THE GROWTH AND CHARACTER OF BUSINESS REGULATORY NETWORKS 
Regulatory authorities have also tried to strengthen coordination of their activities 
through international networks. As regards business taxation, tax authorities, at least 
                                                  
14 Collins et al 1996, Jackson 1998. The main attraction would be the India-Nepal tax treaty, which allows 
exemption from withholding taxes to residents of Nepal, like the India-Mauritius treaty, which led to a 
boom of incorporations of intermediary companies in Mauritius. Although Nepal did introduce some 
legislation with this aim, its attractiveness to investors was marred by political instability, notably the 
massacre of the Royal family by the Crown Prince in 2001, and a resurgence of Maoist guerilla activity.  
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those of the main OECD countries, have developed quite sophisticated arrangements to 
coordinate the assessment and audit of TNCs, under the authority of the tax treaty 
provisions for exchange of information, as well as consultations between the `competent 
authorities’, in order to ensure that taxation is in accordance with the treaty. These 
include simultaneous examinations of TNCs, and coordinated Advanced Pricing 
Agreements, which entail international consultations between the two (or sometimes 
more) tax authorities and the TNC (or its advisers, usually the large accountancy firms), 
to negotiate the methodology the firm uses for setting transfer prices between its 
affiliates.15 Even more informal modes of cooperation have also sprung up at various 
times, such as the Group of Four (France, Germany, the UK and the US) which since 
1972 organised meetings both at Commissioner level, as well as developing programmes 
at staff level for joint study of specific problems, which led to establishment of the 
Simultaneous Examination procedures. Other even more ad hoc groups have exchanged 
information about and discussed specific industries, such as oil and gas and forestry 
products. More recently, Australia, Canada, the UK and the US established a Joint Tax 
Shelter Information Centre.16  
An important node of these networks has been the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs, 
and its various subcommittees. It has worked in a typically technicist and low-key 
manner, despite the sometimes highly conflictual and potentially far-reaching nature of 
the issues with which it deals. It is only in recent years that its work has been given some 
political impetus and has become more visible. This resulted partly from increased 
concern by some leading governments about revenue losses due to international tax 
avoidance, as well as preferential tax regimes being adopted by some countries to attract 
investment. A second, perhaps more important, reason was that these concerns, especially 
regarding the problem of tax havens, became linked to broader issues raised by offshore 
financial centres, such as their use for money-laundering (and more recently still, terrorist 
financing), as well as global financial instability risks.  
Even though there are clear linkages between these issues, they have been dealt with by 
separate regulatory groupings, which have worked along their own distinct functional 
tracks. This results from the informal, ad hoc and even opportunistic manner in which 
regulatory networks have grown, as well as their technicist character. Their almost 
random nature, and their often disparate membership, has made it hard to achieve 
coherence between related although functionally separate areas, and even between 
groupings with overlapping memberships dealing with the same of similar issues. At the 
same time, their single-function focus means that it can be hard to achieve agreement 
                                                  
15 These have become quite extensive and hence highly formalised and bureaucratised: the US IRS now has 
17 teams dealing with APAs, and between 1991 and 2004 has carried out a total of 557 APAs, virtually all 
of which involve bilateral negotiations with treaty partners, some multilateral (see Announcement and 
Report Concerning Advance Pricing Agreements, Internal Revenue Bulletin 2005-16, 
http://www.irs.gov/irb/2005-16_IRB/ar13.html, last accessed 22/6/2006.  
16 See http://www.ato.gov.au/corporate/content.asp?doc=/content/mr2004029b.htm, last accessed 
22/6/2006. 
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among participants, unless there is a strong common interest, since there is no scope for 
trade-offs through package deals. For example, a variety of regulatory bodies and 
networks have emerged to deal with various aspects of regulation of banks, other 
financial institutions and financial markets, including the Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervisors (BCBS), the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 
and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), as well as the 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). Although their work on 
developing international standards for example on capital requirements is clearly related, 
the attempts at coordination between them have met some difficulties (Picciotto 1997, 
Picciotto and Haines 1999).  
Coherence and coordination between regulatory networks has been hard to achieve even 
though they may be linked through an institutional node, or by a broader political 
initiative. This is well illustrated by the issue of tax havens and offshore financial centres. 
Concern about the use of these jurisdictions for money-laundering led to the setting up of 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which was formed in 1989 under the auspices 
of the G7, but actually housed at the OECD in Paris.17 Its work deals with similar issues 
to that of the OECD Fiscal Committee, such as exchange of information, and problems, 
notably bank secrecy. Tax authorities would greatly benefit from being able to exchange 
information with agencies dealing with money-laundering, and this is possible at national 
level in some countries. Joint action might also be helpful in putting pressure on 
jurisdictions which may be reluctant to accept or enforce regulatory standards. Attempts 
have certainly been made to encourage links and cooperation. Indeed, another initiative 
by the G7 explicitly tied together the issues of financial stability, financial crime, money-
laundering, and international tax evasion.18 This certainly succeeded in giving a much 
stronger impetus to the work of the Fiscal Committee on tax havens, resulting in the more 
high-profile project on Harmful Tax Practices, launched by a report in 1998. However, 
this project has so far achieved only limited success, and links with the FATF have been 
minimal.  
F. STATE FRAGMENTATION AND TRANSFORMATIONS 
This problem of functional fragmentation may be seen as part of a larger one of 
technicisation and legitimation in the modern state (Picciotto 2001, Picciotto 2006). In 
the traditional Weberian perspective, technocracy is seen as a means merely of 
implementing policies which have been formulated through political processes. From this 
viewpoint, the growth of delegation to specialist regulators is a response to the problems 
of governing increasingly complex societies, by giving greater autonomy to technocratic 
decision-makers within a policy framework set by government. However, the new forms 
of governance are more decentralized and interactive, which further exacerbates the 
                                                  
17 It is in fact in the main OECD building, whereas the Fiscal Committee is in an Annex. 
18 See Economic Communiqué, Making a success of globalization for the benefit of all, of the Lyon 
Summit of 1996, and the Conclusions of G7 Finance Ministers, London 9 May 1998, both available from 
University of Toronto G8 Information Centre website http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/. 
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legitimacy problems which Weber already identified with the `iron cage’ of bureaucracy 
when it loses its accountability to social values. 
This is especially relevant to global governance, since much of the activity of 
international regulatory networks has been generated by technical specialists or 
`epistemic communities’. This concept was developed within a neo-functionalist 
paradigm, to suggest that a stronger basis for international cooperation may be provided 
by delegating specific issues to be dealt with in a depoliticized manner by specialists 
deploying scientific, managerial or professional techniques and working within shared 
universal discourses (Haas 1992). This concept seemed to maintain the Weberian 
assumption that broad policy goals should be decided politically, so that the delegation 
should be of practical details of implementation, facilitating the resolution of global 
policy issues by `narrowing the range within which political bargains could be struck’ 
(Haas 1992, 378). From this perspective governance networks could be said to strengthen 
the liberal state system, since they simply entail cooperation between government 
officials, who can be held accountable by citizens through national state mechanisms 
(Slaughter 1997).  
There is certainly evidence that global expert action networks have been extremely 
effective in mobilizing and sustaining global governance regimes, for example Canan and 
Reichman’s sociological study of the `global community’ of environmental experts and 
activists which formed around the Montreal Protocol (2002). Far from being 
depoliticized, however, such networks often include activists as well as technical 
specialists; and even if the issues are specialized, the participants share common social 
values. The contribution of technical specialists to international diplomacy is often to 
help gain acceptance for proposals which are put forward as objective and scientific, 
although actually carefully calibrated for political acceptability. Indeed, even some 
liberals such as Anne-Marie Slaughter now seem to concede that global governance 
networks do raise some accountability problems, which perhaps requires them to operate 
as `a kind of disaggregated global democracy based on individual and group self-
governance’ (Slaughter 2004a, 240). In a recent analysis (Slaughter 2004b) she suggests 
that this may entail democratic accountability which is either `vertical’, through the 
classical liberal national state, or `horizontal’, which suggests a new conception of the 
state. The latter, more radical alternative points towards new approaches to democratic 
legitimation of governance based on democratic deliberation (Picciotto 2001). 
Indeed, functional fragmentation may also be seen as reflecting broader changes in the 
nature and relationship of the `public' and the `private' sphere. The transfer of specific 
public functions to what have been described as `non-majoritarian’ regulators (Coen & 
Thatcher 2005) is often justified in terms of the need to insulate some areas of decision-
making from influence by private special interests and the short-term considerations 
which dominate electoral politics. Hence, it also reflects changes in political processes, 
with the breakdown of representative government, which `public choice’ theorists have 
argued is prone to capture by private interests (Buchanan & Tollison 1984). In place of 
party-democracy there has been the emergence of what Bernard Manin has called 
`audience democracy' (Manin 1997), increasingly based on populist forms of political 
mobilization. This in turn poses the question of whether the decentralization or 
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fragmentation of hierarchical government based on formal or instrumental rationality, 
and the shift to networked governance requiring reflexive interactions and based on 
communicative rationality, may offer a basis for new forms of deliberative or discursive 
democracy (Dryzek 1990, 1999). The changes in public-private interactions make it vital 
to find ways to remodel the sphere of political debate and decision-making. Central to 
this are questions about the nature of technocratic governance and the basis of its 
legitimacy. 
In this context, the importance of expertise suggests that the dangers of technicism must 
be addressed. This is especially the case since so many decisions now entail inputs often 
from different specialist or expert fields, as well as an evaluation from the general public 
perspective. Technical rationality can operate in an autocratic way, if it seeks to claim a 
spurious authority. This can be counter-productive, as has occurred in the frequent 
episodes when it has resulted in a spiral of public mistrust of science, and scientists’ 
despair at public ignorance. To avoid technicism, specialists need to acknowledge the 
ways in which their techniques rest on formal models based on assumptions which allow 
them to abstract the specific aspects of an issue or the data with which they are concerned 
from the entirety and complexity of the issue in the real world. Since the conclusions they 
can reach based on such assumptions can only have a partial or conditional validity, they 
should not be treated as determinative of the issue as a whole, but as important 
contribution towards more general public debates. Scientific responsibility should 
therefore include cognitive openness and reflexivity (Dryzek 1990, 1999).19 
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